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Abstract 
 
Human capital is a key factor in value creation in the modern corporation. Yet the disclosure 
of investment in human capital is scant. We propose that a company’s online job postings are 
disclosures made outside of the investor relations channel that contain forward-looking 
information that could be informative to investors about future growth. We find that changes 
in the number of job postings are positively associated with changes in future performance 
and that this relation is stronger when postings likely represent growth rather than 
replacement. Consistent with job postings providing new information to the market, investors 
react positively to changes in the number of job postings. The market reaction to postings is 
stronger when firms are likely to be hiring for growth rather than replacement and for firms 
with low labor intensity (and therefore high marginal productivity of labor). 
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1. Introduction  
In the modern knowledge-based economy, human capital is a key factor in firm 
operations. Although the acquisition of this capital is likely to be relevant to investors, 
financial reporting relating to hiring is quite limited. Unlike numerous disclosures on 
acquisitions of nonhuman resources, such as property, plant, and equipment, companies are 
not required to disclose their hiring activities, except for the number of people they employ at 
the end of the year.1 
The well-recognized inadequacy of disclosures of human capital, including hiring, has 
prompted a group of institutional investors to submit a rulemaking petition to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC 2017). The petition states that there is a broad consensus 
that “human capital management is important to the bottom line” and requests that the 
commission adopt rules that will “require issuers to disclose information about their human 
capital management policies, practices, and performance.”2 A number of organizations in the 
United States and abroad have also called for greater disclosure of human capital.3 
In this study, we propose that company online job postings represent a leading-
indicator disclosure of hiring that companies make outside of their financial reports. We 
examine whether these disclosures contain news to investors. In contrast to the standard 
                                                             
1 The disclosure of the number of employees in 10-K filings is required by Item 101 (Description of Business) 
of Regulation S-K. 
2 The proposal has generated strong support among comment letters writers (https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
711/4-711.htm). In his public comments, the SEC chairman Jay Clayton, acknowledges that human capital is an 
important driver of firm performance. However, he argues that, since human capital circumstances vary widely 
across industries and firms, developing a uniform set of disclosure requirements is difficult (SEC 2019). So, as it 
stands now, the disclosure of human capital in general and hiring in particular remains quite limited. 
3 For example, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) advocates for disclosure of hiring rates and employee 
replacement (https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/gri-standards-download-center/). 
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disclosure channel, where information is disclosed by the investor relations (IR) department, 
job postings are disclosed by the human resources (HR) department. 
We evaluate investor reaction to job postings announcements and how it is influenced 
by firm economic conditions. While hiring increases the level of the firm’s human capital, 
this comes at a cost.4 If the managers and shareholders’ incentives are aligned, management 
will only hire if doing so benefits shareholders. However, hiring may harm shareholder value 
if firms hire too many employees. For example, firms can overinvest, due to empire building 
(e.g., Hope and Thomas 2008), CEO overconfidence (e.g., Malmendier and Tate 2008), or to 
mimic the behavior of good managers while manipulating earnings (Kedia and Philippon 
2009). Relatedly, in the context of acquiring human and nonhuman capital through mergers, 
research finds a significant loss of acquiring-firm shareholder value, as indicated by negative 
announcement returns (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2005; Harford, Humphery-
Jenner, and Powell 2012). Thus, how the market reacts to hiring news and which factors 
affect investor reaction to hiring are important questions. 
We employ novel data on the number of job postings at the firm-day level obtained 
from one of the leading job search engines in the United States.5 Our measure of news about 
a firm’s hiring is the change in the number of active job postings on the company’s career 
website from the previous day.  
                                                             
4 In addition to compensation to new employees, direct hiring costs include job advertising, in-house recruiters’ 
salaries, headhunter fees, and relocation costs. Indirect costs include a decrease in productivity during recruiting, 
training, and initial lower productivity after hiring. The benefits of hiring could also be reduced by the fact that 
new employees are more likely to leave than longer-tenured employees (Griffeth, Hom, and Gaertner 2000). 
5 The interest in job postings data is currently at such a high level that on May 7, 2019, S&P Dow Jones Indices 
announced the launch of the S&P 500 Job Index that will track weekly changes in job postings by S&P 500 
companies (https://us.spindices.com/documents/index-news-and-announcements/20190507-sp-linkup-jobs-
indices-launch.pdf). 
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To better understand the nature of the information contained in job postings, we first 
examine their relation with future number of employees and financial performance. 
Consistent with job postings predicting hiring and employee-related expenditures, we find 
that changes in the number of job postings are positively associated with one-year ahead 
growth in the number of employees and selling, general, and administrative expense 
(SG&A). We also find a positive association between job postings and one-year ahead growth 
in sales and earnings. Further, we find that job postings are a stronger predictor of future 
performance when the likely purpose of hiring is growth rather than replacement (proxied by 
recent growth in sales and employee count). While we cannot measure specific benefits and 
costs inherent in job postings, the finding that postings convey incremental positive 
information about future performance implies that investors should on average price job 
postings positively. 
Consistent with this expectation, we find a significant positive association between 
changes in the number of job postings and cumulative abnormal returns over the two trading 
days around the change (trading days 0 and +1). The reaction remains significant when, in 
addition to removing earnings announcement days, we also exclude days with company 
filings or management guidance and when we control for the number and sentiment of news 
articles for the firm. 
We next examine factors affecting the investor reaction to job postings. First, the 
purpose of hiring someone is either to replace an employee (replacement) or fill a new 
position (growth). While adding a new employee increases the firm’s output, the effect of 
employee replacement is unclear. Thus we expect that the market reaction to hiring will be 
4 
stronger when the firm is more likely to be filling a new position rather than replacing an 
employee. We use growth in sales and employee count from the most recent year prior to the 
job posting to proxy for the purpose of the hiring. Consistent with our prediction, we find that 
the market reaction to job postings is concentrated in firm–years in which the firm is likely to 
be hiring for new positions. Second, in a typical production function where the firm’s output 
is generated by labor and nonhuman capital, the marginal product of labor is increasing 
(decreasing) in the amount of nonhuman capital (labor), i.e., decreasing in labor intensity. 
Thus we expect the effect of hiring to be stronger for firms with lower labor intensity. In line 
with this prediction, we find that the market reaction to job postings is more pronounced 
when labor intensity is low.6 
Concurrent work by Liu (2019) examines the relation between long-term changes in 
job postings and cost of capital. The author finds a negative association between the average 
level of job postings during the quarter as compared to the average job posting in the past two 
years and cost of capital proxies (implied cost of capital and stock returns over the next three 
months). The theme of Liu’s work is parallel to that of Belo, Lin, and Bazdresch (2014), who 
find that annual changes in the number of employees are negatively associated with stock 
returns over the next twelve months. Liu (2019) and our study differ in two major respects. 
First, while Liu’s data contain job postings aggregated at the quarterly level, our data track 
                                                             
6 In additional analyses reported in the Online Appendix, we find that the market reaction is concentrated in 
firms with higher quality information environments (proxied by firm size and analyst following), which is 
consistent with the view that high-quality information can lead to more efficient labor investments by mitigating 
agency issues (e.g., over-hiring due to empire building). We also find that the investor reaction to job postings is 
more pronounced in recent years. This finding is consistent with our expectation that the decline in the 
acquisition and processing costs due to the surge in job search companies should lead to stronger investor 
reaction to job postings in recent years. However, it is also possible that the informativeness of job postings 
increased over time. 
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job postings at the daily frequency. Second, Liu examines the relation between quarterly job 
postings and cost of capital (i.e., firm risk), whereas we examine investor reactions to firms’ 
job announcements.7 
Our study contributes to the literature on the importance of human capital in the 
modern corporation. Lev and Schwartz (1971) propose to measure human capital asset and 
liability as expected future compensation, and Rosett (2001) finds that human capital liability 
estimated in this way for unionized firms is associated with higher equity risk. Zingales 
(2000) argues that human capital has become the firm’s most valuable asset and calls for 
research on how this capital is acquired and lost. Several studies examine the determinants of 
annual changes in the number of employees (e.g., Pinnuck and Lillis 2007; Kedia and 
Philippon 2009; Jung et al. 2014). Finally, research investigates the relation between human 
capital and firm risk (e.g., Belo et al. 2014; Donangelo 2014; Liu 2019). We add to this 
literature by studying how investors react to hiring news in the form of job postings and 
examining factors that influence the market reaction. 
Our study also contributes to the disclosure literature. (For reviews, see Healy and 
Palepu 2001; Beyer et al. 2010; Leuz and Wysocki 2016.) The rise of new technologies 
changes how firms disseminate disclosures (e.g., Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller 2003; 
Blankespoor, Miller, and White 2014) and how investors acquire information (e.g., Drake, 
Roulstone, and Thornock 2012). The literature has modeled disclosure as the communication 
                                                             
7 The difference between our study and prior work can be most easily seen using Campbell’s (1991) return 
decomposition. Campbell (1991) shows that stock returns are comprised of three distinct components: expected 
returns, cash flow news, and discount rate news. While Liu (2019) and Belo et al. (2014) examine the first 
component of stock returns, that is, expected returns (long-term risk), we examine the second component, that 
is, cash flow news (immediate announcement reaction). 
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between investor relations (IR) and the capital markets. In contrast, job postings are disclosed 
by human resources (HR) and driven by different incentives, that is, to inform and attract job 
candidates. They are not regulated by the SEC and likely erode the investor relations’ control 
over the timing and amount of the information revealed to outsiders. The usefulness of job 
postings to investors is potentially impaired by lower comparability and higher information 
acquisition costs. Our results suggest that, despite these limitations, job postings are 
informative to investors. Our findings enhance understanding of the corporate disclosure 
environment and its effects on capital markets.  
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
2.1 Sample Data 
The daily job posting data are obtained from one of the largest job search engines in 
the United States. The firm scrapes job postings in real time directly from companies’ 
websites. At the end of 2016, the data covered more than 14,000 public and private 
companies. The firm uses the data to provide search services for job seekers. The firm also 
provides job market data to employers, data analytics companies, and other data seekers 
including institutional investors.  
We obtain data that contain the number of job postings that are currently active and 
open for a given firm-day. Although information on the job function and level, geographic 
location, and the number of employees the company plans to hire would be useful for our 
analysis, unfortunately we do not have this information. 
Table 1 presents details of the sample selection. We begin with a sample of 33,431 
public and private firms from August 1, 2007, the day when the data commence, to December 
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31, 2016. Removing firms that are not covered by Compustat or CRSP reduces the sample by 
30,437 firms.8 We then drop observations with missing necessary financial data or stock 
returns and observations that coincide with earnings announcement dates. Our final sample 
contains 2,826,160 firm-day observations for 2,255 firms. 
2.2 Changes in the Number of Job Postings 
We calculate the daily change in the number of active job postings for firm j day t as 
the percentage change in the number of active job postings for firm j day t from day t−1. We 
then rank the daily changes into five quantiles.9 Quantiles 1 to 2 contain an equal number of 
negative changes, quantile 3 contains zero changes, and quantiles 4 and 5 contain an equal 
number of positive changes. We assign the rank values of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1 to 
observations in quantiles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively.10 We denote the resulting variable as 
ΔJobPostingsjt. 
3. Empirical Results  
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for key variables and control variables. 
The mean (median) number of active job postings, JobPostings, on the firm’s career website 
is 187 (40). The mean (median) daily percentage change in the number of job postings, 
ΔJobPostings(%), is 0.0427 (0.0000) percentage points, and the standard deviation is 3.1571 
                                                             
8 When we exclude utilities and financial services firms (SIC codes 4900–4999 and 6000–6999), the results are 
similar (see the Online Appendix). 
9 The results (reported in the Online Appendix) are robust to using unranked changes. 
10 Given the distribution of daily changes in the number of job postings (see Section 3.1), quantiles 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 contain 6.61%, 6.60%, 74.14%, 6.37%, and 6.27% of the sample observations, respectively. 
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percentage points. While the number of job postings does not change on the majority of firm-
days (74.14%), a substantial number of firm-days (25.86%) have nonzero changes in the 
number of job postings (untabulated). The mean (median) number of employees is 11,574.46 
(2,964). 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the mean daily percentage change in the number of job 
postings by calendar month. The number of job postings tends to increase throughout most of 
the calendar year, followed by a noticeable drop in November and December. The largest 
increases are found in January, February, and March (0.1187, 0.841, and 0.0856 percentage 
points per day, respectively). The only two months in which the average number of job 
postings decreases are November and December (−0.0569 and −0.0256 percentage points per 
day, respectively), suggesting that there is a decline in the hiring activity around the holiday 
season. While we are not aware of studies examining the reasons for the hiring slowdown at 
the year-end, anecdotal evidence suggests that end-of-year deadlines and holiday vacations 
may divert resources away from hiring and that companies may reduce hiring in response to 
the decline in job applications during the holiday season (Smith 2018).11  
3.2 Future Financial Performance and Number of Employees 
To better understand the nature of the information contained in job postings, we begin 
our analysis by examining how job postings relate to future accounting performance and 
future changes in the number of employees. 
                                                             
11 It is also possible that the cost of hiring in December is higher because new employees are entitled to time off 
around the winter holidays. The cost for qualified job seekers to change employers may also be higher in 
December, since they may forgo bonuses earned during the year. 
9 
 The most direct effect of greater hiring, all else equal, is an increase in the number of 
employees and employee-related expenses. Since most US firms do not separately disclose 
labor costs, we follow prior research and use selling, general, and administrative expense 
(SG&A) as a noisy proxy for employee-related expenditures (e.g., Bell, Landsman, Miller, 
and Yeh 2002; Banker, Huang, and Natarajan 2011; Bova, Kolev, Thomas, and Zhang 2015). 
For firm performance, we use revenues and earnings.  
 Motivated by the firm production function, where output is generated by physical and 
nonphysical capital, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Rajgopal, Venkatachalam, and Kotha 
(2003) model earnings as a function of the firm’s tangible and intangible assets. Since we 
study changes in hiring, we adopt a growth (or change) perspective by specifying growth in 
earnings (revenue, SG&A, and number of employees) as a function of growth in tangible and 
intangible capital. 
As discussed earlier, job postings provide more timely information to outsiders than 
do periodic financial reports. While the first set of financials for fiscal year t+1 is released 
after the end of the first quarter of year t+1 at the first-quarter earnings announcement, firms 
begin to disclose job postings immediately after the beginning of year t+1. We incorporate 
the more timely availability of job postings disclosures to investors by estimating the 
regression of growth in earnings (revenue, SG&A, and number of employees) in year t+1 on 
growth in the number of job postings in the first three months of year t+1 (i.e., prior to the 
release of first-quarter financial results for year t+1) and the control variables of year t, as 
follows. 
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ΔEarningsjt+1 (ΔRevenuejt+1, ΔSG&Ajt+1, or ΔEmployeesjt+1) = α1 + β1 ΔJobPostingsjt+3m 
+ β2 ΔEarningsjt + β3 ΔRevenuejt + β4 ΔSG&Ajt + β5 ΔEmployeesjt + β6 ΔCapExjt 
+ β7 ΔR&Djt + β8 ΔADVjt + β9 BMjt + εjt, (1) 
where ΔEarningsjt+1 (ΔRevenuejt+1, ΔSG&Ajt+1, ΔEmployeesjt+1) is the change in operating 
income after depreciation (revenue, SG&A expense, number of employees) for firm j year 
t+1, relative to year t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t. ΔJobPostingsjt+3m is the 
change in the average number of active job postings in the first three months of year t+1, 
relative to the same period in year t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t. We ranked 
ΔJobPostingsjt+3m into five quantiles in a similar way to the daily change in the number of job 
postings. To proxy for growth in tangible (intangible) capital, we use ΔCapExjt (ΔR&Djt, 
ΔADVjt), defined as the change in capital expenditure (R&D expense, advertising expense) 
for firm j year t relative to year t−1, scaled by total assets at the end of year t−1. We also add 
growth in earnings (revenues, SG&A, and number of employees) in year t and BMjt, the 
book-to-market ratio at the end of year t, to control for other potential effects of growth not 
captured by the above measures. 
The results, presented in Table 3, are consistent with job postings containing positive 
information about future financial performance. ΔJobPostingsjt+3m is positively associated 
with subsequent growth in the number of employees, SG&A expense, revenue, and earnings. 
The results are in line with the expectation that hiring boosts growth in employee count, 
labor-related costs (SG&A expense), and output (revenue). The positive coefficient on 
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ΔJobPostingsjt+3m in the earnings growth regression indicates that the effect on revenue is 
greater than on expenses.12 
3.3 Announcement Returns 
We evaluate the news contained in firms’ job postings announcements by using their 
association with stock returns. We assess the investor reaction to changes in the number of 
active job postings by estimating the following regression of announcement returns on daily 
changes in the number of job postings. 
CARjt = α1 + β1 ΔJobPostingsjt + β2 Sizejt + β3 BMjt + εjt, (2) 
where CARjt is the cumulative abnormal return for firm j over the two-day window around 
the change in the number of job postings (trading days 0 and +1). The abnormal return is the 
firm’s daily return minus the CRSP value-weighted daily return. The change in the number of 
job postings, ΔJobPostingsjt, is defined in Section 2.2. To control for risk, we include firm 
size, Size, defined as the market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal year, and the 
book-to-market ratio, BM, calculated at the end of the previous fiscal year. In addition to 
removing earnings announcement days, we also estimate equation (2) excluding days when 
the firm files 10-Q, 10-K, or 8-K filings and days when management issues guidance. This 
avoids the need to control for news contained in company filings and management guidance 
and enhances the reliability of our inferences. 
To further control for concurrent news, we estimate the following regression on a 
                                                             
12 In an additional analysis reported in the Online Appendix, we find that job postings are more informative 
about future performance when they are more likely to represent growth rather than replacement (that is, when 
the firm’s growth in sales and employee count is high). 
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subsample of observations with available data on news articles and news sentiment: 
CARjt = α1 + β1 ΔJobPostingsjt + β2 Sizejt + β3 BMjt + β4 NewsArticlesjt 
+ β5 NewsSentimentjt + εjt, 
(3) 
where NewsArticles is the number of news articles for the firm for the day obtained from 
Bloomberg. NewsSentiment is the sentiment of the news articles for the firm for the day 
obtained from Bloomberg. Bloomberg uses a proprietary algorithm to assign each news 
article a sentiment score on a scale of −1 (most negative) to 1 (most positive). The scores are 
then aggregated for the firm over a 24-hour period.13 
 The results, reported in Table 4, are consistent with a positive market reaction to job 
postings. The first column shows the results for the sample that includes all observations. The 
coefficient on ΔJobPostings is positive and significant. The coefficient on ΔJobPostings 
remains significant when we exclude days when there is a nonzero change in the number of 
job postings on the day before or the day after the event date, observations with a zero change 
in the number of job postings, and days with company filings or management guidance (the 
second column). The last column shows that the finding is robust to controlling for the 
number and sentiment of news articles. Since ΔJobPostings ranges from 0 to 1 (in the bottom 
and top quantile, respectively), the coefficient of 0.0307 on ΔJobPostings in the last column 
implies a difference in the incremental CAR of 0.0307 percent over the two-day window, 
when moving from the bottom to top quantile of ΔJobPostings. The effect is likely to be 
                                                             
13 Since equations (2) and (3) examine market reactions to daily announcements, they do not control for 
information disclosed in past announcements such as past financial performance. As a robustness check, we add 
controls for past growth in employee count, earnings, sales, SG&A expenses, CapEx, R&D expenses, and 
advertising expenses, and find similar results (reported in the Online Appendix). 
13 
larger for explaining returns over longer time periods because longer intervals include many 
changes in the number of job postings. 
3.4 Factors Affecting Market Reaction to Job Postings 
The results so far suggest that job postings convey positive information to investors. 
However, investor reaction to job postings is likely to vary across firms. In this section, we 
identify and test factors, described below, that are likely to influence the market reaction to 
hiring news. 
A firm hires for two reasons. The first is when the firm is growing and hires for a new 
position. The second is when an employee has left or plans to leave the firm. Then the firm 
needs to hire a replacement employee. While adding a new employee increases the firm’s 
output, the effect of employee replacement is unclear. Thus we expect that hiring will have a 
stronger effect on shareholder value when the firm hires for growth than when it replaces 
someone. To proxy for whether hiring represents growth or replacement, we use recent 
growth in sales and employee count. If the firm is in the top half of the sample for the 
previous year’s sales (employee) growth, then we assume that the firm is hiring for growth. If 
the firm is in the bottom half of the sample for the previous year’s sales (employee) growth, 
then we assume that job postings are more likely to represent replacement.14 
The market reaction to hiring news is also likely to be a function of labor intensity. In 
a typical production function, where the firm’s output is generated by labor and nonhuman 
capital, the marginal product of labor is increasing (decreasing) in the amount of nonhuman 
                                                             
14 As a robustness check, we use sales growth and employee growth in the current year to proxy for the market 
expectation for growth and find similar results (see the Online Appendix). 
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(labor) capital employed (e.g., Imrohoroglu and Tuzel 2014).15 The higher marginal 
productivity of labor, in turn, increases the effect of labor investment on firm value. Thus 
hiring new employees is likely to have a bigger impact on shareholder value for firms with 
relatively larger (smaller) amounts of nonhuman (labor) capital, i.e., for firms with low labor 
intensity. We use labor intensity at the industry level, calculated as the ratio of the number of 
employees to total assets. We also use the number of employees divided by total assets at the 
firm level. 
We estimate the market reaction model (2) within subsamples (of the final sample in 
Table 1), based on the factors described above, and report the coefficients on the daily change 
in the number of job postings, ΔJobPostings. Observations above (below) the median are 
allocated into high (low) subsamples. 
The results, presented in Table 5, are consistent with our predictions. The market 
reaction to job postings is concentrated in the firm-years in which the firm is more likely to 
hire for growth than replacement. The coefficient on ΔJobPostings is positive and significant 
when hiring for growth and insignificant when the firm hires for replacement. As indicated by 
the F-test, the difference between the two subsamples is significant. The market reaction to 
job postings is also more pronounced when labor intensity is low. The difference between the 
two subsamples is significant at the two-sided p = 4.4% (10.7%) level, when using the 
industry- (firm-) level proxy for labor intensity. The result is consistent with the expectation 
that hiring an employee has a stronger effect on the output when the number of employees is 
                                                             
15 For example, in the Cobb-Douglas production function, the output (Q) is a function of labor (L) and 
capital (K): Q = ALαKβ. The marginal product of labor, ∂Q/∂L = αAKβ/L1-α, is an increasing (decreasing) 
function of capital (labor). 
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relatively low (and therefore the marginal productivity of each employee is higher). 
4. Conclusion 
Motivated by the limited financial reporting on human capital, this study proposes 
that job postings on company career websites represent disclosures to outsiders about the 
company’s hiring plans and thus could be informative to investors about future growth. We 
use novel data to examine the information contained in companies’ job postings disclosures. 
We find that changes in the number of job postings are positively associated with future 
changes in employee count, employee-related expenditures, and financial performance. The 
market reacts positivley to changes in the number of job postings. Our cross-sectional 
analyses show that the positive market reaction to hiring news is more pronounced when the 
likely purpose of hiring is to add new employees rather than to replace employees leaving the 
firm, and for firms with low labor intensity. The market reaction to job postings is more 
pronounced in recent years, which is consistent with the increased accessibility of structured 
job postings data to investors or the increased informativeness of job postings over time, a 
topic we suggest for future research. 
Our study contributes to the literature on the importance of human capital by 
introducing a measure of hiring news based on job postings disclosures and examining the 
investor reaction to hiring news and how it is affected by firms’ economic conditions. We also 
extend the disclosure literature by examining disclosures made through the human resources 
channel, rather than the investor relations channel. Our evidence on the immediate market 
reactions to job postings disclosures should be relevant to regulators who wish to ensure that 
companies disseminate information in ways that do not disadvantage some investors. The 
16 
findings should also be relevant to managers and investor relations departments, who are 
responsible for effective communication of company disclosures to investors. 
Job postings convey news about human capital investments. Since the decision to 
invest in human capital is likely to be affected by several factors, including firm growth 
opportunities, CEO change, labor market conditions, and financing frictions, further research 
on how these factors influence firms’ decision to hire and the market reaction to job postings 
would be worth pursuing. Furthermore, research can examine how the increased availability 
of job postings data from alternative data marketplaces changed firm and investor behavior.  
17 
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Table 1  
Sample Selection 
 
  No. of firms 
No. of  
firm-days 
Available job postings data 33,431 38,852,028 
Less: 
  Not covered by Compustat or CRSP (30,473) (34,372,765)
Missing necessary financial data (667) (1,236,208) 
Firm-day observations that coincide with earnings 
announcement dates 
(0) (126,513) 
Missing stock returns (36) (290,382) 
Final sample 2,255 2,826,160 
 Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean StdDev P10 P25 Median P75 P90 
Market Reaction Tests        
JobPostings 187 470 3 12 40 126 417 
ΔJobPostings(%) 0.0427 3.2978 -1.3605 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.2238 
CAR(0,+1)(%) 0.002 2.822 -3.103 -1.367 -0.029 1.330 3.116 
Market Value 6,306.72 14,534.57 149.91 460.25 1,516.63 4,618.46 15,340.89 
Size 7.3035 1.7670 5.0100 6.1318 7.3242 8.4378 9.6383 
BM 0.5390 0.4716 0.1101 0.2458 0.4432 0.7336 1.0979 
Employees 11,574.46 24,384.99 313 824 2,964 10,049 29,537 
Employees/TA 4.0466 6.1597 0.2065 0.6951 2.1043 4.3459 9.1744 
Industry Labor Intensity 0.0393 0.0557 0.0023 0.0102 0.0228 0.0452 0.0853 
Future Performance Tests        
ΔJobPostingst+3m 0.0013 0.0065 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0021 
ΔEarningst 0.0057 0.0645 -0.0537 -0.0131 0.0058 0.0256 0.0615 
ΔRevenuet 0.0439 0.1754 -0.1128 -0.0103 0.0373 0.1128 0.2226 
ΔSG&At 0.0129 0.0472 -0.0185 0.0000 0.0048 0.0256 0.0604 
ΔEmployeest 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0007 
ΔCapExt 0.0021 0.0252 -0.0181 -0.0043 0.0009 0.0088 0.0235 
ΔR&Dt 0.0026 0.0170 -0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024 0.0150 
ΔADVt 0.0007 0.0050 -0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0032 
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Panel B: The Distribution of the Average Daily Change in the Number of Job Postings by Calendar Month 
January February March April May June July August September October November December 
0.1187 0.0841 0.0856 0.0683 0.0303 0.0279 0.0270 0.0614 0.0415 0.0592 -0.0569 -0.0256 
The table reports summary statistics. Panel A provides the descriptive statistics of key variables. JobPostings is the number of daily active job postings on the 
firm’s career website. ΔJobPostings(%) is the change in the number of job postings from the previous day, expressed as percentage points. CAR(0,+1) is the 
cumulative abnormal return over the two-day window that includes the date when the number of active job postings changed and the following day, expressed 
as percentage points. The abnormal return is the firm’s daily return minus the CRSP value-weighted daily return. Market Value is the market value of equity 
at the end of the previous fiscal year. Size is the logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal year. BM is the book-to-market ratio 
at the end of the previous fiscal year. Employees is the number of employees at the end of the previous fiscal year. Employees/TA is the number of employees 
divided by total assets at the end of the previous fiscal year. Industry Labor Intensity is labor intensity at the industry level calculated as the ratio of the 
number of employees to total assets. ΔJobPostingst+3m is the change in the average number of active job postings in the first three months of the year relative 
to the same period last year, scaled by total assets.  ΔEarnings (ΔRevenue, ΔSG&A, ΔEmployees, ΔCapEx, ΔR&D, ΔADV) is the change in operating income 
after depreciation (revenue, SG&A expense, number of employees, capital expenditure, R&D expense, advertising expense) from to the previous year, scaled 
by total assets. Panel B reports the distribution of the mean daily change in number of job postings expressed as percentage points, ΔJobPostings(%), by 
calendar month.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
 Table 3  
Future Performance 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 ΔEmployeest+1 ΔSG&At+1 ΔRevenuet+1 ΔEarningst+1 
          
ΔJobPostingst+3m 0.0017** 0.1491*** 0.9927*** 0.3216*** 
 
[2.36] [3.05] [6.30] [4.44] 
ΔEarningst 0.0006*** 0.0474** -0.0055 -0.1278*** 
 [2.64] [2.30] [-0.07] [-3.38] 
ΔRevenuet 0.0002* 0.0092 0.0548 0.0058 
 
[1.91] [1.20] [1.24] [0.53] 
ΔSG&At 0.0010** 0.2397*** 0.3046*** 0.0013 
 
[2.40] [4.90] [3.70] [0.03] 
ΔEmployeest -0.0000 0.0312 0.0501 -0.1001 
 [-0.08] [0.96] [0.47] [-1.64] 
ΔCapExt 0.1864*** 10.3163*** 40.8352*** -2.7009* 
 
[4.25] [6.96] [8.53] [-1.65] 
ΔR&Dt 0.0004 0.2241*** 0.0798 -0.4058*** 
 
[0.72] [3.37] [0.51] [-2.96] 
ΔADVt 0.0028 0.6735** 1.3305** -0.0049 
 
[0.95] [2.47] [2.16] [-0.02] 
BMt -0.0001*** -0.0033** -0.0383*** -0.0126*** 
 
[-3.15] [-2.06] [-5.05] [-4.10] 
     Observations 6,241 6,253 6,253 6,253 
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.228 0.176 0.0683 
This table reports the results of estimating equation (A1). The dependent variable ΔEarningst+1 
(ΔRevenuet+1, ΔSG&At+1, or ΔEmployeest+1) is the change in operating income after depreciation 
(revenue, SG&A expense, and number of employees) for year t+1, relative to year t. ΔJobPostingst+3m 
is the ranked change in the average number of active job postings in the first three months of year t+1 
relative to the same period in year t. ΔCapExt (ΔR&Dt, ΔADVt) is as the change in capital expenditure 
(R&D expense, advertising expense) for year t, relative to year t−1. BMt is the book-to-market ratio at 
the end of year t. Values in brackets represent t-statistics. The regressions are estimated with industry 
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests.  
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Table 4  
Market Reaction 
 
  Full sample Restricted sample 
Restricted sample with 
available data for news 
articles and sentiment 
    
ΔJobPostings 0.0242** 0.0258** 0.0307** 
 [2.17] [2.32] [2.57] Size -0.0018 -0.0051 -0.0136** 
 [-0.34] [-0.81] [-2.09] BM 0.0266 0.0348 0.0652** 
 [1.44] [1.41] [2.27] NewsSentiment   0.0000 
   [1.53] 
NewsArticles   0.0001* 
   [1.76] 
    
Observations 2,826,160 704,296 512,647 
Adjusted R2 0.0038 0.0038 0.0042 
This table reports the results of estimating market reaction equations (2) and (3), where cumulative 
abnormal return, CAR, over the two-day window (trading days 0 and +1) is regressed on the ranked 
change in the number of job postings for day 0 from day −1, ΔJobPostings, the market value of 
equity, Size, the book-to-market ratio, BM, the number of news articles, NewsArticles, and the average 
sentiment of news articles, NewsSentiment. Values in brackets represent t-statistics. The restricted 
sample in the second column excludes observations with a nonzero change in the number of job 
postings in the previous or next day, observations with zero change in the number of job postings on 
the event day, days when the firm files 8-K, 10-Q, or 10-K, and days when management issues 
guidance. In the last column, we also exclude observations without available data for news articles 
and sentiment. The regressions are estimated with year-month fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and time (year-month). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
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Table 5  
Factors Influencing Market Reaction to Job Postings 
 
     Panel A – Hiring for Growth Versus Replacement 
Replacement   Growth  
Low Sales Growth 0.0066  High Sales Growth 0.0409*** 
 [0.43]   [3.36] 
F-test (p-value): (0.033)    
     
Low Employee Growth 0.0071 
 
High Employee Growth 0.0402*** 
 [0.49]  [3.25] F-test (p-value): (0.024)    
     
Panel B – Labor Intensity 
Low Labor Intensity   High Labor Intensity  
Low Industry Labor Intensity 0.0402*** 
 
High Industry Labor Intensity 0.0071 
 [3.15]  
Intensity [0.48] 
F-test (p-value): (0.044)   
     
Low Employees/TA 0.0368*** 
 
High Employees/TA 0.0109 
 [2.78]  
 [0.76] 
F-test (p-value): (0.107)   
     
This table reports the results of estimating market reaction equation (2) within the indicated 
subsamples. The table reports the coefficient estimates on ΔJobPostings. Values in square brackets 
represent t-statistics. The p-values, reported in round brackets, are for the two-tailed F-test of the 
difference in the coefficients between the indicated subsamples.  The regressions are estimated with 
time (year-month) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time (year-month). ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed 
tests. 
